|
The Polish crisis of 1980–1981, associated with the emergence of the Solidarity mass movement in Poland, challenged the Soviet Union's control over its satellite states in the Eastern Bloc. For the first time however, the Kremlin abstained from military intervention, unlike on previous occasions such as the Prague Spring of 1968 and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and thus left the Polish leadership under General Wojciech Jaruzelski to impose martial law to deal with the opposition on their own. == Initial reaction == thumb Contrary to the interpretations of US intelligence, no preparations were underway for even minimal Soviet intervention at the time martial law was imposed, according to declassified Soviet archives.〔Douglas J. MacEachin, ( Soviet military activity near the Polish border in "US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis 1980–1981" ) (section Bloc-Country Archives Open), CSI Publications, 2007〕 On August 25, a special commission was created in Moscow to formulate policy in response to developments in Poland. It was headed by senior Communist Party ideologist Mikhail Suslov, and included KGB chairman Yuri Andropov, foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and defense minister Dmitriy Ustinov. They were reluctant to intervene in Poland, recalling the Polish 1970 protests, and dealing already with problems in the ongoing Soviet war in Afghanistan. The East German and Czechoslovak leaders, Erich Honecker and Gustáv Husák, however, were eager to suppress Solidarity, along the lines of previous crackdowns. The aging Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev agreed with Honecker and Husák, leaning towards intervention. A planned joint Soviet, East German and Czechoslovak attack, under the pretext of a Warsaw Pact military exercise called 'Soyuz-80,' was planned for December.〔Vojtech Mastny. (The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War ), Working Paper No. 23, Cold War International History Project, Washington, D.C., September 1998, also published in ''Europe-Asia Studies'', Vol. 51, No. 2 (Mar., 1999), pp. 189–211.〕 Deeply concerned Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) leaders, who had initially been lenient, slowly began to consider suppression of the popular movement on their own. On October 22, Polish defense minister Jaruzelski started planning for martial law.〔 United States intelligence, by this time, had an accurate idea of the Warsaw Pact's plans. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski persuaded President Jimmy Carter to disclose the Warsaw Pact military build-up publicly and to warn the Soviet Union of its consequences.〔〔http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ece/research/intermarium/vol2no1/jaruzels.pdf〕 On December 5, at the insistence of Honecker, the Warsaw Pact countries held a summit in Moscow. The Polish leader, first secretary of the PUWP Stanisław Kania, promised to do his best to uproot the opposition by domestic means. Brezhnev didn't insist on armed intervention, Kania having managed to persuade him that foreign intervention would lead to a national uprising. Intervention was postponed, to give Polish leaders a chance to deal with the situation on their own.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Soviet reaction to the Polish crisis of 1980–81」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|
